On July 20, local time, Japan’s 27th House of Councillors election officially commenced. 522 candidates will vie for 125 seats in this election, which Japanese media have described as a crucial battle determining Japan’s direction for the next five years.
For Prime Minister Ishiba Shigeru, this is an even more crucial political gamble he cannot afford to lose.
Failure to maintain a Senate majority for the ruling coalition could not only make him Japan’s shortest-serving prime minister of the 21st century but could also potentially end the Liberal Democratic Party’s 70-year reign.
Why is that?
This election is unique because Prime Minister Ishiba’s Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) already lost its majority in the House of Representatives election last year and can only maintain its government with the support of Komeito and smaller parties. If the LDP also loses its majority in the House of Councillors, the Ishiba administration will become a lame-duck government.
Currently, the Liberal Democratic Party and Komeito Party hold only 75 seats in the uncontested seats. To maintain a majority (125 seats), they must secure an additional 50 seats.
However, multiple public opinion polls indicate a continued decline in support for Ishiba’s ruling coalition. The Yomiuri Shimbun predicts that the LDP may win only slightly more than 30 seats in the contested seats, and with Komeito at most winning 10 seats, they will still fall short of their goal by nearly 10 seats.
This means that if the ruling coalition loses its majority, not only will major issues such as constitutional revision and security legislation be deadlocked, but even the annual budget could be vetoed by a combined opposition.
More critically, this election is also seen as a referendum on Ishiba’s leadership.
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Since assuming office in October 2024, Ishiba’s cabinet approval rating has plummeted from 38% to a record low of 20.8%, while disapproval has soared to 55%.
However, there is an unspoken rule in Japanese politics that a support rating below 20% puts a leader in danger of being forced to resign, potentially facing a party coup.
Should the election results prove unfavorable, the anti-Ishiba faction within the Liberal Democratic Party will undoubtedly seize the opportunity to attack him, demanding accountability for the defeat.
In other words, Ishiba’s position as Prime Minister is precarious.
However, why has Prime Minister Ishiba’s path to governance become so arduous when he has not yet completed a full year in office?
Ishihara’s predicament is not accidental but the result of long-term accumulation.
Japan is experiencing its worst inflationary crisis since the 1980s. The CPI index rose 4.0% year-on-year in May, exceeding 4% for six consecutive months. Food prices, particularly rice and beef, have seen particularly sharp increases, with a 5kg bag of rice exceeding ¥4,200 (approximately RMB 218).
The soaring price of rice, in particular, has sparked the “Reiwa Rice Riot.” Despite government releases of reserve rice, manipulation by middlemen controlled by the Japan Agricultural Cooperatives (JA) has resulted in less than 7% actually reaching the market, leaving consumers struggling with rice rationing.
Meanwhile, real wages in Japan have fallen year-on-year for five consecutive months, with a 2.9% drop in May, the largest decline in nearly two years. This phenomenon has directly led to a contraction in consumer purchasing power and persistently sluggish household consumption.
Despite the Ishiba Shigeru government’s salary increase plan, which promises wage growth exceeding inflation by 2025 and plans to distribute cash subsidies of ¥20,000-40,000 to all citizens, SMEs generally lack the capacity for salary increases due to rising costs. The government’s subsidy policy has been criticized as a mere ‘quick fix’ that fails to address the fundamental structural problems.
In contrast, the opposition party’s proposals, such as a reduction in consumption tax, are more appealing against the backdrop of rising prices.
To make matters worse, Trump’s tariff threat has become another major burden for Ishiba.
The Trump administration announced it would impose a 25% tariff on Japanese imports to the United States, threatening to increase the rate to 50% if Japan retaliated. The automotive industry, which accounts for ¥20 trillion in annual exports and 5.5 million jobs, would be most immediately affected.
Toyota, Honda, and other automakers saw their stock prices plummet by over 4% in response to Trump’s tariff threats, and Japan’s GDP is projected to decline by 0.8% as a result.
However, Ishiba Shigeru’s response policy is a textbook example of fence-sitting.
On the one hand, he stated that he “would not compromise national interests,” refusing to concede on agricultural tariffs; on the other hand, he did not dare to completely offend the United States, given that Japan relies on imports for 60% of its energy and its security depends on the US military presence.
At the G7 summit, while Ishiba Shigeru directly confronted Trump, refusing to open the beef market, he secretly pledged to increase imports of US liquefied natural gas afterward. This strategy of “tough talk and actual compromise” yielded neither US concessions nor prevented domestic criticism of diplomatic incompetence.
Furthermore, the long-standing scandal of “money politics” within the Liberal Democratic Party continues to erode public trust.
In 2024, five major factions within the Liberal Democratic Party, including the Abe faction, disbanded due to financial scandals, leaving only the Aso faction operational. This resulted in significant turmoil within the party’s power structure.
Despite presenting himself as a reformer, Ishiba Mo’s allocation of 20 million yen to local branches for “expanding party influence activities” drew criticism for being a case of ’same wine, new bottle’.
The combined effect of political corruption and policy incompetence has caused the Liberal Democratic Party’s approval rating to remain stagnant at around 20%, with a particularly significant loss of support among younger voters.
Is it possible for Ishiba Shigeru to stage a comeback? It’s highly unlikely!
Data from Japan’s Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications shows that early voting reached a record high of 21.45 million, with a significant increase in voters under 30.
High voter turnout typically signifies strong public dissatisfaction with the status quo. These young voters, more concerned with employment and prices than constitutional revision or foreign policy, are likely to cast their ballots for opposition parties.
More perilous is the threat posed by the rise of new populist parties. The ’Sansei Party,’ established just five years ago, has adopted the slogan of ’Japanese First,’ advocating for restrictions on foreign employment, scrutiny of foreign mergers and acquisitions, and has attracted some voters dissatisfied with the status quo.
The party’s support rate continues to surge in key electoral districts such as Tokyo and Saitama. The Asahi Shimbun predicts they may win 15 seats, becoming the third-largest party in the House of Councillors. This would make it nearly impossible for the ruling coalition, including the Liberal Democratic Party, to secure 50 seats.
Faced with a desperate situation, Ishiba Shigeru is making a last-ditch effort.
To reverse the declining trend, Ishiba Shigeru has implemented a series of emergency measures. For example, he announced a change in rice policy, increasing rice production from 2025; he not only introduced a plan for nationwide cash subsidies of 20,000 to 40,000 yen but also pledged a significant salary increase next year. Furthermore, he has been campaigning across the country, attempting to reshape his image through street speeches and media appearances.
Furthermore, the Liberal Democratic Party pulled out all the stops for this House of Councillors election, deploying almost all of its elite members to campaign. Even former Prime Minister Taro Aso, in his eighties, along with rising stars Shinjiro Koizumi and Takayuki Kobayashi, joined the campaign trail to support candidates.
However, regardless of the election outcome, it seems inevitable that Japan stands at a historical turning point.
Should Ishiba Masashi lose, he will inevitably become a scapegoat for the LDP’s decline; even if he miraculously wins, it will be difficult to reverse Japan’s deep-seated contradictions of an aging population, hollowed-out industries, and diplomatic dependence.
This former “policy expert” and “constitutional revision vanguard” may ultimately become a casualty of Japan’s bygone political era.
Image source: Internet