![\"f787377fde8b622c007a2b16f35d33deu1\"](\"http:\/\/forefrontnews.cn\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/07\/f787377fde8b622c007a2b16f35d33deu1.png\" "\\"f787377fde8b622c007a2b16f35d33deu1\\"")
\nOn 27 September 2012, the Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to the United Nations General Assembly, using a schematic to warn that Iran was in the final stages of producing weapons-grade uranium. Image Source: foreign media<\/p>\n
In the previous article in this series, we discussed the causes and consequences of the Iranian nuclear issue and its evolution into a crisis, in particular the role of the United States. In today’s article, we turn our attention to Israel, the regional stakeholder at the heart of the Iranian nuclear issue. \u201cIsrael has a secret nuclear program of its own, along with its nuclear program of Iran Containment,\u201d the New York Times reported on June 17 during the 12-day Israeli-iraqi conflict, soon after its founding in 1948, Israel resolved to build a nuclear arsenal to guarantee its survival. While Israel neither recognizes nor denies its nuclear arsenal from its official diplomatic standpoint, it is widely believed to possess a considerable nuclear capability. Driven by historical memories of the Second World War and the Yom Kippur War, and influenced by the subtle attitudes of Western powers, Israel gradually established a nuclear strategy of \u201cNuclear ambiguity\u201d and \u201cPre-emptive strike\u201d, on the one hand to protect themselves and reduce security threats, but on the other hand may also lead to a more insecure regional situation.<\/p>\n
\nOn 27 September 2012, the Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to the United Nations General Assembly, using a schematic to warn that Iran was in the final stages of producing weapons-grade uranium. Image Source: foreign media<\/p>\n
\u201cIsrael’s interest in nuclear weapons dates back to the founding of the nation.\u201d<\/p>\n
Israel’s interest in nuclear weapons dates back to the country’s founding in 1948, according to the US magazine national interest. The geographic lack of strategic depth, the historical memory of the Holocaust and the first Middle East War have convinced David bin Gurian, the \u201cFather of Israel\u201d, that, the\u201cUltimate deterrent\u201d is needed to ensure national security. The Israel Atomic Energy Commission was established in June 1952, the bomb will ensure that\u201cWe will never again be brought to the slaughter like lambs\u201d.<\/p>\n
Since the 1950s, Israel began to secretly advance the nuclear program, then the international environment has also given Israel to develop nuclear technology conditions. During the Suez Crisis of 1956, Israel and France reached an agreement — Israel to cooperate with and French military operations in Egypt, and France to provide nuclear reactor assistance to Israel. Referring to France’s agreement to supply a plutonium production reactor, the required uranium fuel and a reprocessing plant for the production of plutonium, virtually all the facilities needed by Israel to make a nuclear bomb had been provided, and no state had ever provided Israel with nuclear technical assistance on such a scale, either at that time or since.<\/p>\n
Soon after, in 1958, Israel began building a nuclear research center near Dimona, in the southern Negev of the country. In December 1960, the Joint Atomic Intelligence Commission reported that the Dimona project included a reprocessing plant for plutonium production, related to nuclear weapons. Researchers believe that around 1962, the Israeli nuclear reactor into a critical state, began to produce weapons-grade plutonium. On the eve of the Third Middle East War in 1967, according to US Arms Control Association, Israel had successfully assembled its first nuclear device.<\/p>\n
There are three considerations behind neither admitting nor denying<\/p>\n
Western powers have played a complex role in advancing Israel’s nuclear programme. Although initially supported by the French, the DeGaule administration suspended nuclear co-operation with Israel after 1966 because of concerns about proliferation in the Middle East. The Kennedy administration tried to verify Dimona, but the Israelis refused.<\/p>\n
The change of heart occurred during the Richard Nixon administration. In September 1969, Mayor, then Israeli Prime Minister, and Richard Nixon, then American president, reached an unwritten agreement — as long as Israel did not publicly declare that it possessed nuclear weapons and did not conduct nuclear tests, the US dropped pressure on it to join the treaty on the non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) . According to the academic circles, this\u201cNuclear tacit agreement\u201d in fact recognizes Israel’s nuclear status, which marks the formation of the\u201cNuclear ambiguity\u201d strategy: Israel neither admits nor denies its nuclear status, and does not disclose the details of its nuclear capabilities, nor does it accept international verification. Israel has repeatedly stressed that it\u201cWill not be the first country to introduce nuclear weapons into the Middle East.\u201d.<\/p>\n
The\u201cNuclear ambiguity\u201d strategy has three main considerations: first, to increase the credibility of the deterrent, which is feared by the enemy because the size of nuclear weapons can not be ascertained; second, to avoid international condemnation, not being public reduces the pressure on one’s own and on allies; and, finally, maintaining technological freedom allows for the continued development of nuclear capabilities without disruption.<\/p>\n
However, the policy also faces an exposure crisis. In 1986, Mordecai Vanunu, a former technician at Dimona’s nuclear research centre, revealed to the British press the inside story of a number of Israeli nuclear programmes, including underground plutonium extraction plants and estimates of warhead production. Reported that Israel can produce about 40 kilograms of plutonium each year, may have made hundreds of nuclear warheads. Hoinounou was later sentenced to 18 years in prison for treason and espionage.<\/p>\n
The international community has a delicate attitude towards Israel’s nuclear capabilities. The United Nations Atomic Energy Agency has repeatedly called on Israel to open its nuclear facilities to verification, but Israel is neither a party to the NPT nor allows substantive international verification. The United States has imposed\u201cDouble standards\u201d on Israel, and Congress continues to approve high levels of military aid, even though the United States is\u201cConvinced that Israel has nuclear weapons,\u201d as the Federation of American scientists article puts it, it has also repeatedly blocked international resolutions calling for nuclear disarmament. According to Stockholm International Peace Research Institute estimates, Israel currently has 80-90 nuclear warheads.<\/p>\n
The two strategies are inside and outside each other<\/p>\n
The fourth Middle East War, also known as the Yom Kippur War War, became the key point that triggered the transition to a nuclear strategy. On October 6,1973, Egypt and Syria raided Israel on Yom Kippur. In the first few days of the war, the once-mighty Israeli army was losing ground. Within two or three days, the Egyptians had captured about 70 per cent of Sinai Peninsula and the Syrians were deep in the north. Faced with a desperate situation, the Israeli authorities are seriously considering the use of nuclear weapons for the first time. On the night of October 8, Prime Minister Mayor authorized Israeli forces to place several nuclear warheads on the Jericho medium-range ballistic missile, targeting Cairo and Damascus, according to later top-secret documents. The move amounts to an\u201cUltimatum\u201d to the US that Israel could use nuclear weapons in self-defence if it does not provide immediate assistance. The United States then launched an emergency airlift to rearm the country for a short period of time, eventually helping to tide it over.<\/p>\n
After the war, the Israeli side, \u201cMust not wait for the enemy to hit the door\u201d became the consensus, \u201cPre-emptive strike\u201d gradually became an important security concept. In the late 1970s, the then Menachem Begin government further institutionalised this principle into \u201cBeginism\u201d, which meant that hostile states would not be allowed to possess nuclear weapons, if there are signs of a\u201cPre-emptive\u201d preventive strike.<\/p>\n
The\u201cPre-emptive strike\u201d strategy and the\u201cNuclear ambiguity\u201d strategy mentioned earlier are two sides of the same coin. \u201cNuclear ambiguity\u201d allows Israel to cast a shadow of uncertainty over its enemies, increasing deterrence and reducing outside interference. A\u201cPre-emptive strike\u201d ensures no nuclear rivals are around to avoid the dilemma of having to use nuclear weapons openly.<\/p>\n
Since the establishment of the\u201cPre-emptive\u201d principle, Israel has repeatedly put into action. The first was the 1981 destruction of an Iraqi nuclear reactor, also known as the \u201cOperation Opera.\u201d. In the late 1970s, the Saddam regime built a french-aided nuclear reactor in Operation Opera. In June 1981, Israel launched a precision air strike against the reactor. In a matter of minutes, the Operation Opera reactor building was razed to the ground, destroying the country’s costly nuclear program. After this operation, \u201cWe will not allow the enemy to develop weapon of mass destruction against the Israeli people, and we will protect Israeli citizens in a timely manner and by all available means,\u201d the Menachem Begin Government said in a statement that was also seen as the first public announcement of its \u201cPre-emptive\u201d security strategy.<\/p>\n
The nuclear program of Iran was more of a moving target for more than 20 years than a clear target to be destroyed in one go, and the Israelis imposed a full-scale, multi-layered, long-term containment.<\/p>\n
Israel’s most common means of destruction is intelligence infiltration and network destruction, the 2010\u201cStuxnet\u201d virus attack is a typical case. Israel used the computer worm, developed jointly by US and Israeli intelligence agencies, to successfully hack into the centrifuge control system at Iran’s underground uranium enrichment plant at Natanz, causing about 1,000 centrifuges to self-destruct at high speed. Experts told the New York Times that the attack set back Iran’s uranium enrichment process by at least two years.<\/p>\n
The second is assassination and targeted killing. According to media reports and the Iranian special envoy to the International Atomic Energy Agency, the Israelis were \u201cBehind the assassination\u201d of Iranian nuclear scientists. Between 2010 and 2012, at least four nuclear physicists involved in the nuclear program of Iran were killed in Tehran’s streets, and in November 2020, \u201cThe father of the Iranian nuclear bomb,\u201d said Mosen Fahrizad was ambushed by remote-controlled machine guns.<\/p>\n
The third is overt air strikes and military deterrence. In October, an Israeli air strike on a secret nuclear weapons development facility in Iran’s Parchin 2024 destroyed equipment used for bomb-triggering tests, American officials told Axios news. In the Israeli-iranian conflict in June, Israel for the first time sent hundreds of sub-warplanes on the Iranian territory of Natanz and dozens of nuclear bases and missile towers carpet attack.<\/p>\n
The last is diplomatic lobbying and sanctions. Over the years, Israeli leaders have repeatedly sounded the alarm bell on the\u201cIranian nuclear threat\u201d in the international arena, advocating the imposition of severe sanctions on Iran. After the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of action, also known as the Iran nuclear deal, the Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu publicly opposed it and even went directly to the US Congress to lobby. In 2018, the Donald Trump administration, then in its first term, unilaterally withdrew from the deal and reinstated top-level sanctions.<\/p>\n
Complicating the security situation in the Middle East<\/p>\n
After more than two decades of nuclear program of Iran, the country has yet to hit the nuclear-weapons-grade threshold. Israel is believed to have nuclear weapons, but it has not used them in war. Still, some of Israel’s actions have had a knock-on effect that complicates the security situation in the Middle East.<\/p>\n
On the one hand, Israel’s hard-line deterrent forced some Arab countries to abandon the nuclear race in the short term. After the destruction of the Operation Opera Reactor, Libya, which had also considered the nuclear option, dropped its nuclear ambitions in 2003, and stopped pursuing nuclear weapons after several failed Egyptian-israeli wars. In part, it is Israel’s strikes that have made its neighbors see the high risk of pursuing nuclear weapons.<\/p>\n
On the other hand, Israel’s strike strategy also sows the seeds of hatred and escalation of armaments. Some of the countries that have been hit may turn to other means of confronting Israel, such as the development agent force. Opinion polls conducted by mainstream Arab media show that more than 80% of the Arab public hold\u201cExtremely negative\u201d views of Israel in 2025, higher than in the 1970s, the intergenerational transmission of hatred is worrying.<\/p>\n
Israel’s\u201cToothpaste-squeezing\u201d nuclear deterrent could spark a new arms race in the region. Saudi Arabia, for example, has made it clear in recent years that it\u201cHas no choice but to seek its own nuclear safeguards\u201d if Iran acquires nuclear weapons. According to Reuters and other Western media reports, Saudi Arabia is embarking on a pilot program to enrich uranium. Egypt, Turkey and others are also closely monitoring the situation and assessing their nuclear options.<\/p>\n
Israel’s frequent military strikes are also eroding international rules, leading to legitimacy dilemmas. \u201cPre-emptive\u201d strikes are often not authorized by the United Nations, and existing support could be lost if Israeli strikes cause significant collateral damage or escalate regional conflicts. In recent years, differences of opinion between the United States and Israel on the issue of Iran have also emerged. The United States fears that Israel’s rash actions could ignite a war, while Israel considers its\u201cSafety net\u201d unreliable. Such a rift, if expanded, will further affect the U. S.-ISRAEL alliance.<\/p>\n
Therefore, in the long run, Israel may be in a\u201cSecurity dilemma,\u201d that is, the more\u201cPre-emptive\u201d the attack, the more the enemy goes underground to seek revenge, and the more tense and unstable the regional situation, and Israel, feeling insecure, will be more proactive, which could create a lose-lose cycle. The writer is executive director of the Middle East Institute, HSBC Business School, Peking University<\/p>\n
Next time on TV:<\/p>\n
A series of difficult paradoxes can be found behind Israel’s nuclear strategy of\u201cNuclear Ambiguity + pre-emptive strike\u201d. This combination of fist tactics for Israel to fight for survival space, in the short term effectively blocked the nuclear process of potential adversaries, but also objectively deepened the hatred and mistrust between Israel and the surrounding countries, put the security situation in the region in a more dangerous situation. Nuclear weapons can destroy cities and facilities, but they can not fill the deep fear gap between peoples and religions. To get out of this\u201cGame of survival\u201d, it may be the only way to break the thinking of absolute confrontation and seek a common framework for regional security. In the next issue, we will continue to tell you what difficulties the international community is facing in order to find a peaceful and political solution to the Iranian nuclear issue, and how to find a breakthrough.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
In the previous article in this series, we discussed the causes and consequences of the Iranian nuclear issue and its evolution into a crisis, in particular the role of the… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":5868,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[266,249],"tags":[337,2690,393,2691],"views":48,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"http:\/\/forefrontnews.cn\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/5867"}],"collection":[{"href":"http:\/\/forefrontnews.cn\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"http:\/\/forefrontnews.cn\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/forefrontnews.cn\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/forefrontnews.cn\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=5867"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"http:\/\/forefrontnews.cn\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/5867\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":5869,"href":"http:\/\/forefrontnews.cn\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/5867\/revisions\/5869"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/forefrontnews.cn\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/media\/5868"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"http:\/\/forefrontnews.cn\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=5867"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/forefrontnews.cn\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=5867"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/forefrontnews.cn\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=5867"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}